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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF BRONX: HOUSING PART H
----------------- -------------------------------~-----x

SADE C FRANCIS,
L&T Index No.
30042119

Petitioner,
-against-

Motion Seq. No. 1

MANNY STEIN; 1229-1273 REALTYLLC; the
DEPT. OF HOUSING PRESERVATION

DECISION/ORDER

AND DEVELOPMENT (DHPD),
Respondents.

--------------------------------------------------x
Present:
Hon. HOWARD J. BAUM

Judge. Housing Court
Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of the motion
by Respondents Manny Stein and 1229-1273 Realty LLC seeking the dismissal of the
proceeding:

Numbered

Papers

Notice of motion, Affirmation and Exln1'it annexed..... ... ........... .. .. _ l
Affidavit in Opposition .............. ....... .............. ........... ........... l
Reply Affirmation ....... .. .......... .. ..................... ..... .............. .
Aft~r oral argument and upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision and order on this

motion is as follows:

Sade Francis ("Petitioner'f) commenced this HP proceeding seeking an order to correct
violations she alleged existed in the apartment that is the subject of this proceeding, the
imposition of civil penaJties if the existing violations were not corrected in a timely manner and a
finding, pursuant to NYC Ad.min Code§§ 27-2005(d), that alleged acts and/or omissions by
Respondent Manny Stein and/or Respondent 1229- 1273 Realty LLC ("Respondents") constitute
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harassment as well as various forms of relief to which she may be entitled if such a finding is
made. The New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development ("DHPD") is
also a respondent
Petitioner, a self-represented litigant at the commencement of this proceeding, 1 alleged

within her petition that the apartment in which she resides is in a multiple dwelling. Further, she
has alleged several conditions within the apartment in need of repair. Additionally, as to her
claim that she has been harassed, Petitioner alleges Respondents have repeatedly failed to make
repairs in the apartment in a timely manner and that violations of record have been issued. 2
Petitioner's cause of action seeking the entry of an order to correct was resolved on July
17, 2019 with the entry, on consent, of an order to correct. This consent order had the effect of
bifurcating the harassment cause of action from the other relief sought in the petition.
In this motion, Respondents seek the dismissal of the harassment claim based on their
assertion that, pursuant to CPLR 321 l(a)(3), Petitioner "has no standing to sue" and/or, pursuant
to CPLR 321 l(a)(7), Petitioner has failed to state a cause of action. The factual basis of the
motion is an e-mail sent by Petitioner, dated December 11, 2019, in which she states that she and
her daughter no longer live in the apartment. Thus, Respondents argue that if Petitioner does not

1 Petitioner

retained an attorney by the first date this proceeding was on the court's calendar, July

17, 2019.
2 Petitioner has

also checked off the boxes, in the form provided to self-represented tenants to fill
out when filing a harassment HP proceeding, pursuant to NYC Admin Code§ 27-2005(d),
alleging Respondents have used force or implied the use of force against her (corresponding to
the definition of harassment stated in NYC Admin Code§ 27-2004(a][48][a]) and failing to
comply with a vacate order by failing to correct the conditions that led to the issuance of the
vacate order (corresponding to the definition of harassment stated in NYC Admin Code§ 272004[a][48][c]). However, no specific facts have been stated in the petition in support of these
alleged bases for a finding of harassment.
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reside in the apartment she lacks the standing to maintain this proceeding, and that she has
therefore failed to state a cause of action,3 and this proceeding should be dismissed.
In opposition, Petitioner' s attorney states in a memorandum of law that, despite what was
stated in the e-mail, Petitioner has not surrendered the apartment or removed her possessions and
maintains the apartment as her home. However, no affidavit has been submitted by Petitioner or
anyone else with personal knowledge of these facts. Instead, Petitioner has submitted a copy of a
February 5, 2020, stipulation of settlement in a non-payment proceeding between the parties,4
executed by Petitioner as evidence that she is still defending her right to the apartment.

Discussion
Preliminarily, CPLR 321 l(a)(3) states that a proceeding should be dismissed where ''the
party asserting the cause of action has not legal capacity to sue." 1bis provision, which is one of

the grounds under which Respondents assert Petitioner's harassment cause of action should be
dismissed, is frequently confused with, but distinct from, the concept of a petitioner lacking
standing to maintain a claim. Graziano v. County ofAlbany, 2 NY3d 475 (2004); Community Bd

3

Respondents have not presented any basis, other than their assertion that she lacks standing, in
support of their assertion that Petitioner has failed to state a cause of action.
4

The stipulation of settlement in the non-payment proceeding, known as 1225-1273 Realty
Corp. v. Francis, Bronx County L&T Index No. 54975/19, includes provisions in which the
parties agreed that a sum certain was owed in rent arrears through February 29, 2020; that the
arrears were to be paid by March 5, 2020; that several conditions in the apartment were allegedly
in need of repair; that access for repair work was to be provided on specified dates; and that
either party could restore the proceeding to the court's calendar in the event the other side
defaulted on the agreement.
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7 ofBorough of Manhanan v. Schaffer, 84 NY2d 148 (1994); Security Pacific Nat. Bank v.

Evans, 31 AD3d 278 (1st Dept 2006).
The legal capacity to sue, as used in CPLR 32ll (a)(3), relates to a party's status, for
example '~that of an infant, an adjudicated incompetent, a trustee, or certain governmental
entities ... " Security Pacific Nat. Bank v. Evans, 31 AD3d 278 (1 st Dept 20-06). In contrast,
standing involves a determination as to whether the " party seeking relief [in a court proceeding]
has a suffici enLly cognizable stake in the outcome" to have a right to come to court to ask for a
judicial resolution of the matter. Graziano v. County ofAlbarry, 2 NY3d 475, 479 (2004), quoting

Community Bd 7 of Borough ofManhaJtan v. Schaffer, 84 NY2d 148 (1994); see also, In re
World 1}ade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation, 30 NY3d 377 (2017). ''The
standing analysis is, at its foundation, aimed at advancing the judiciary's self-imposed policy of
restraint, which precludes the issuance of advisory opinions." Commun;ty Bd 7 ofBorough of

Manhattan v. Schaffer, 84 NY2d 148, 155 (1994), citing Cuomo v. Long Is. Light. Co. , 71 NY2d
349 (1988).
Although Respondents have stated one of the grounds for the dismissal of the harassment
cause of action is CPLR 321 l(a)(3), their argwnents in support of the motion are based on
Petitioner's lack of standing. Accordingly, considering Respondents have not presented an
argument for thjs proceeding to be dismissed based on Petitioner's Jack of capacity to sue, the
motion is denied to the ex.tent it seeks dismissal pursuant to CPLR 321 l (a)(J).
Further, under the circumstances of this proceeding, Respondents' assertions that
Petitioner lacks standing to maintain the proceeding, in effect, that her daim is ao longer
justiciable if she bas vacated the premises, and that she has therefore fai led to state a cause of
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action, are unavailing. Respondents cite to an unreported decision in Robyn v. Acona, New York

County L&T Index No. 1566/ 19, in which the court, citing to Elshiekh v. 76th St. Owners Corp. ,
36 Misc 3d 139(A) (App Term 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dist2012) dismissed an HP proceeding, like
this, with a claim of harassment, because there was no dispute the petitioner had vacated the
premises. The decision, in a short form order, does not state any other facts related to the case.
Respondents' reliance on Robyn v. Acona, supra, is misplaced. Here, there is a dispute as
to whether Petitioner has relinquished possession of the p!'emises. Although Petitioner did not
submit an affidavit from anyone with personal knowledge to contradict what she said in her

December 11, 2019 e-mail, Respondents have not disputed that she is actively litigating a nonpayment proceeding in Housing Court and signed a stipulation of settlement on February 5,
2020, approximately 2 months after the e-mail.
Moreover, contrary to Respondents' argument, Elshiekh v. 76th St. Owners Corp. , 36

Misc 3d 139(A) (App Term 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dist 2012), is distinguishable from the issues in
dispute in this motion. In Elshiekh, the court ruled that a tenant who has been lawfully evicted
lacks the standi.ng to maintain an HP proceeding seeking an order to correct violations in the
apartment from which the tenant was evicted. Thus, in accordance with Graziano v. County of

Albany, and Community Bd 7 ofBorough ofManhattan v. Schaffer, supra, the court recognized
that an evicted tenant lacks a sufficiently cognizable stake in whether violations in an apartment
from which he bas been evicted are corrected to seek a judicial order requiring the correction of

the vioJations.
This ruling in Elshiekh is inapplicable to Petitio.ner' s claim of harnssment. Unlike an
evicted tenant's Jack of entitlement to the entry of an order to correct, Petitioner's current
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physical possession of the apartment, alone, is not determinative of whether she bas standing to
maintain this proceeding to obtain the relief she is seeking on her claim that she has been
harassed pursuant to NYC Admin Code§ 27-2005(d).

Local Law 7 of 2008, which included the cause of action for harassment codified in NYC
Ad.min Code§ 27-2005(d),s was enacted as a remedial statute to bar acts and omissions by a
landlord intended to cause a person lawfully entitled to occupy a dwelling to vacate the dwelling
or surrender or waive any rights in relation to the occupancy. Aguaiza v. Vantage Properties,

LLC, 69 AD3d 422 (J st Dept 20 l O); 317 West 89th Street, LLC v. Engstrom, 36 Misc 3d
1242(A) (Sup Ct NY County 2012).
NYC Adm.in Code§ 27-2004(aX48), the statutory section that defines what constitutes
harassment, pursuant to NYC Adm.in Code§ 27-2005(d). plainly states that a harassment claim
may be maintained even if a tenant, such as Petitioner, has vacated the apartment that is the
subject of the proceeding. That section of the administrative code states, in pertinent part,

rnhe term "harassment" shall mean any act or omission by or on behaJf of an

owner that (i) causes or is intended lo cause any person lawfully entitled to

occupancy ofa dwelling unit to vacate such dwelling unit or to surrender or waive
any rights in relation to such occupancy, and (ii) includes one or more of the
following acts or omissions, [including] (b-2) repeated failures to correct
hazardous or immediately hazardous violations of this code or major or
immediately hazardous violations of the New York city construction, codes,
relating to the dwelling unit or the common areas of the building containing such
dwelling unit, within the time required for such corrections. NYC Admin Code §
27-2004(a)(48)(b-2). [Emphasis added].

s Local Law 7 of2008 also added NYC Admin Code§ 27-2004(a)(48); and amended NYC
Admin Code§§ 27-211 5 and 27-2120 to include provisions related to the newly created
harassment cause of action.
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Moreover, NYC Admin Code§ 27-2004(a)(48) states that where the person filing a
harassment claim resides in a multiple dwelling (as Petitioner has alleged by checking off the
box on the form petition that states she does "not live in a one or two family house"), there "shall
be a rebuttablc presumption [that the type of acts or omissions enumerated within the statutory
section] were intended to cause such person to vacate such dwelling unit or surrender or waive
any rights in relation to such occupancy."

Thus, considering that the repeated failure by an owner to correct hazardous or
immediately hazardous violations of the Housing Maintenance Code, as has been pleaded by
Petitioner, is included in the definition of harassment and if this alleged failure can be established

by Petitioner at trial there is a rebuttable presumption that it was intended to cause her to vacate
the apartment, there is no basis to conclude that Petitioner has not stated a cJaim pursuant to
NYC Admin Code§ 27-200S(d). Moreover, under these circumstances, even if Respondents'
assertion that Petitioner is not currently residing in the premises is true, it can hardly be said she
no longer has a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome of her harassment claim to have a
right to come to court to ask for a judicial resolution of the matter (Graziano v. County ofAlbany

and Community Bd 7 ofBorough ofManhattan v. Schaffer, supra) when the legislature enacted
Local Law 7 to specifically address claims by a lawful occupant of an apartment that acts or
omissions by an owner caused them to vacate the apartment and authorized lawful occupants to

"apply to the hotising part for an order directing the owner to appear before the court'' for an
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adjudication of such harassment claims in the context of this type of HP proceeding (NYC
Admin Code§ 27-2115[h][l]). 6
Accordingly, even if Petitioner has vacated the subject premises while this proceeding

was pending, she satisfies the two-part test for determining standing in this proceeding in that she
has alleged an "injury in fact" within her petition and the injury for which she is seeking a
remedy plainly falls within the zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected
by the statutory provision under which this proceeding was commenced. See, New York State

Assn. ofNurse Anesthetists v. Novello, 2 NY3d 207 (2004), citing Society ofPlastics Indus. v
County ofSuffolk, 77 NY2d 761 (1991) and Matter ofColella v Board ofAssessors, 95 NY2d
401 (2000).
For these reasons, Respondents' motion is to dismiss this proceeding on the ground of
Petitioner's lack of standing and failure to state a cause of action is denied.
This proceeding is placed back on the court's calendar on May 14, 2020 at 9:30 am, Part
H, (Room 590) for the parties to appear before the court for a preliminary trial conference and to
choose a trial date if this proceeding is not otherwise settled. Considering the court is currently
working on a reduced scheduled through at least March 27, 2020, and that date may be extended,
as circumstances require, to best secure everyone's health and safety, the parties should confirm
that the court will be hearing this proceeding on May 14th before coming to court on that day.

6

Th.is Decision/Order makes no determination as to what may be included within the
"compensatory damages" that may be awarded to a lawful occupant of a dwelling upon a finding
that she has been harassed by an owner. See, NYC Admin Code§ 27-21 lS(o)(i).
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This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: Bronx, New York
March 23. 2020

/'\

~ \/'- ~ L--~ _;\ '"' -·
Roi{ HOWARD J. AUM~
J.H.C.
H OVt.a.~n

J. gf:mff
JUDGE. HOUS!il!G COURT
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